

Turning Private Sector Resources into Political Power: Investigating the Utilization of Firm Resources for Electoral Purposes by Businessperson Politicians in Thailand

Abstract

The literature indicates that high-income individuals, especially businessperson candidates, consistently achieve electoral success across many countries. What electoral strategy do businessperson politicians employ to win votes and achieve high electoral success? In this article, I put a spotlight on private sector resources, a type of resource scarcely explored in the existing literature on distributive electoral strategies, by arguing that ownership of a private corporation offers politically aspiring businesspeople an alternative and exclusive source of campaign manpower: private sector employees. Businessperson candidates, unconstrained from the regulatory and budgetary limitations that non-businessperson candidates encounter when relying on public sector and party workers for political services, gain increased flexibility and an electoral advantage by employing private sector employees for political services, thereby fostering private sector patronage employment. Through list experiments conducted in Thailand, I identify the various political services provided by private sector employees to improve the electoral chance of businessperson candidates. I find that 39.9%, 28.8%, 19.1%, 19.3%, and 8.8% of employees in Thai businessperson candidates' firms turned out to vote for the businessperson they work for, attend political rallies, persuade acquaintances to support their employer, distribute short-term business benefits to voters, and distribute long-term business benefits to voters, respectively. Additionally, I provide evidence of strategic patronage hiring by showing that employees hired two months prior to election day are more likely to provide these political services.

1 Introduction

Across various nations, it has been consistently observed that affluent individuals demonstrate a higher propensity to contest political offices and are disproportionately represented in elected offices (Carnes and Lupu, 2015; Dal Bó et al., 2017). Among these wealthy individuals, businessperson, in particular, is an occupational group that is highly represented in the political arena (e.g. Carnes and Lupu, 2015; Carnes, 2012; Weschle, 2021; Semenova, 2012). For instance, in the Thai Parliament, businesspeople have consistently ranked as either the most or the second-most represented occupational group since the late 1960s, with around 20-40% of MPs possessing a business background. The high representation of businesspeople can be attributed to their disproportionate electoral success relative to other occupational groups. In Thailand, while only around 20%, 27% and 24% of MP candidates in the 2001, 2007 and 2019 Thai elections were businesspeople, 27%, 35% and 31% of the successful candidates were businesspeople in 2001, 2007 and 2019 respectively (Electoral Commission of Thailand, 2001, 2007, 2019).

While wealth undoubtedly plays a role, wealth alone may not fully explain an electoral candidate's success, given that it is businesspeople, in particular, who have performed well in elections. In this article, I aim to answer the following question: what electoral strategy is employed by businessperson politicians that provide them with the electoral success over non-businessperson candidates, both wealthy and non-wealthy? While financial resources certainly aid in areas like advertising and potential vote buying, I argue that the unique advantage for businessperson candidates lies in their exclusive (or comparatively greater) access to private

sector labor capable of providing electoral services to businesspeople.¹ This unique access means that, unlike their non-business counterparts, businessperson candidates face fewer limitations stemming from legal, budgetary, and incumbency constraints, which typically curtail the extent and nature of political services provided by traditional campaign workers and public sector employees.

More specifically, I argue that businessperson candidates are able to distribute private sector jobs to assemble an army of labor that can provide numerous election-related services. Not only do these private sector political workers allow businessperson candidates to access additional services beyond those provided by traditional campaign workers and public sector employees, but they also perform certain types of political services with greater efficiency.² In exchange for these private-sector jobs, patronage employees are expected to provide the following political services: 1.) turning out to vote for the businessperson candidate on election day, 2.) attending political rallies, 3.) persuading acquaintances to support businessperson politicians, and 4.) distributing goods and services produced by firms to voters. In summary, access to and the distribution of private sector jobs provide businesspeople with the workforce that gives businessperson candidates an electoral advantage under conditions where several constraints restrict the effective political services provision by traditional campaign workers and public sector employees.

¹ The definition of businessperson politicians used in this article is provided in Appendix A.

² Unlike traditional campaign workers who are hired to primarily engage in electoral campaign activities, private sector patronage employees are hired to engage in both firm activities and campaign activities during the election season.

Because some of the behaviors under study in this article are considered illegal in Thailand, the focus country of this study, while others can lead to negative career consequences, employing a traditional survey methodology would not elicit truthful answers from the employees. Given the illegal nature of some political services, social desirability bias would drive respondents to deny taking part in activities such as the distribution of firms' goods and services in return for votes. Meanwhile, employees may be hesitant to directly admit that they failed to provide political services because such admission can potentially result in dismissal at work if businessperson politicians find out about it. Therefore, respondents have incentives to lie if they are asked directly about these activities through traditional survey methods. Studies in the field have recently begun using list experiments to circumvent social desirability bias and to elicit truthful answers to sensitive questions from respondents (Oliveros, 2021; Kramon, 2016; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012). List experiments do not directly ask respondents whether they engage in sensitive activities and thus provide respondents with denial plausibility and anonymity that will allow us to obtain information about their engagement in sensitive behaviors.

Using list experiments, I provide evidence that private sector employees can be utilized for electoral purposes by demonstrating that employees in firms associated with businessperson candidates provided several political services to support these candidates in their election campaigns. I find that 39.9%, 28.8%, and 19.1% of employees in firms tied to businessperson politicians turn out on election day to vote for businessperson candidate, attend rallies of businessperson candidate, and persuade members within their social network to support the

businessperson candidate they work for, respectively. Additionally, results from list experiments indicate that employees within firms of businessperson politicians also engaged in the distribution of goods and services produced by their respective firms. Notably, a larger proportion of employees were involved in distributing short-term business benefits (19.3%) compared to long-term benefits (8.8%) to voters.

To further demonstrate that these political services are primarily provided by patronage private sector employees and that businessperson candidates do not actively mobilize existing private sector employees who were not initially hired with the expectation of providing political services, I examine the variation in the level of political activities undertaken by employees who are hired within two months of the election day and those hired during other time periods (more than two months before the election and post-election). Results from list experiments reveal that employees hired two months or less before the election are more actively involved in providing political services than employees hired outside this timeframe. These findings suggest that businessperson politicians intentionally increase their hiring of employees around election time to assemble a dedicated workforce for providing political services, while employees hired at other times are not expected to engage in such activities.

This article proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the potential constraints politicians face when relying on traditional campaign workers and public sector employees to provide political services. Second, I argue that businessperson candidates, who encounter these constraints, can utilize private sector employees to enhance the level and type of political services they receive, thus enabling them to conduct a more effective electoral campaign. Third, I discuss how

businessperson candidates distribute private sector jobs in exchange for the provision of political services by those they hire, as well as identify these political services in this section. Fourth, I situate the mobilization of private sector employees for electoral purposes in the context of Thailand. Fifth, I discuss the list experiment design used to quantify the prevalence of private sector employees' provision of political services. In the following section, the results from the list experiments are discussed. In the final section, I conclude by summarizing the findings and discussing potential future work.

2 Constraints in the Utilization of Traditional Campaign Workers and Public Sector Workers in the Provision of Political Services

A body of research underscores the pivotal roles that traditional campaign workers³ and public sector employees assume within a politician's electoral campaign. These key players undertake a wide array of activities, ranging from legitimate tasks such as grassroots mobilization, rally attendance, and logistical support, to illicit activities such as vote-buying and turnout-buying through the distribution of goods and services or withholding access to public services contingent upon political support (e.g. Bergan et al., 2005; Oliveros, 2021; Nichter, 2008; Brusco et al., 2004; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016; Allina-Pisano, 2010). The political services provided by these actors are aimed at improving the candidate's chances of electoral victory.

However, relying on traditional campaign staff and public sector employees to provide campaign services can encounter several constraints that curtail its effectiveness. While

³ Traditional campaign workers discussed here can include party staff.

significant strides have been made in recent decades toward understanding the political services provided by campaign workers and public sector employees, relatively little attention has been devoted to the constraints faced by politicians when mobilizing these employees to provide political services (Allen, 2015; Yildirim and Kitschelt, 2020; Takahashi, 2017). In this section, I will explore these constraints in greater detail.

To comprehensively grasp these constraints, I assume that traditional campaign workers are typically employed either directly by the candidate or by political parties (Stokes et al. 2013; Aspinnall and Mas'udi, 2017). Meanwhile, public sector employees receive their salaries from the government budget, even if they harbor political loyalties to specific electoral candidates or parties (Oliveros, 2021; Robinson and Verdier, 2013; Toral, 2020).

2.1 Budgetary Constraints

When hiring traditional campaign workers and engaging in patronage hiring of public sector employees, candidates face fiscal constraints dictated by the available financial resources for hiring.

While existing scholarship has not extensively explored the financial constraints politicians encounter when drawing from their personal wealth to assemble a campaign team, it stands to reason that affluent candidates possess greater capability to fully staff their campaigns and to offer competitive salaries to attract competent campaign staff. Crucially, for this strategy to be effective, a significant portion of the candidate's wealth should be in liquid assets, enabling the immediate remuneration of campaign staff. Thus, for many electoral candidates,

the hiring of traditional campaign workers might be impractical due to limited access to sizeable liquid capital during the election season. As such, candidates with limited personal wealth may struggle to build a sizable team of competent campaign workers capable of effectively providing political services.

Hiring traditional campaign workers can also be done by political parties, using financial resources bankrolled by wealthy individuals, public donations, or state subsidies (Webb and Kolodny, 2006). However, this option will only be feasible when parties are well-financed. Political parties need to have unfettered access to financial resources to hire a sizeable army of campaign workers who will be effective in providing political services. Cash-strapped parties will not have the resources to hire enough competent campaign workers to engage in campaign activities, hindering their chances of electoral success, especially in developing democracies where campaign volunteers are not as prevalent (Sudulich and Wall, 2011).

When it comes to the utilization of public sector employees for the provision of political services, the government budget serves as a constraint that limit the quantity and types of patronage hiring possible for an electoral candidate (Allen, 2015, Yildirim and Kitschelt, 2020). The size of the public budget has been shown to have implications for the ability of incumbent politicians to shore up political support and, consequently, to determine the competitiveness of an election (Boulding and Brown, 2014). In particular, a politician controlling an office with a limited personnel budget will not be able to engage in substantial patronage hiring to build a team of loyal public sector employees who can provide political services in support of the politician's electoral campaign, thereby affecting a politician's ability to win an election.

2.2 Legal and Regulatory Constraints

A politician's attempt to assemble a labor force for electoral services is limited not only by budgetary constraints but also by legal constraints. Many countries enforce limits on campaign expenditure, and the hiring of campaign staff typically falls under campaign spending (Ohman, 2012). Consequently, there is a ceiling on the amount an electoral candidate and their affiliated political party can allocate to campaign personnel. This imposed limitation on campaign expenditure forces a candidate and their party to make a strategic choice: they can either hire a larger number of less qualified workers with lower wages or employ a smaller number of more qualified workers with higher wages.⁴

Moreover, strong campaign finance regulations, accompanied by rigorous reporting requirements, can curtail the capacity of a candidate and their party to leverage traditional campaign workers for specific political tasks. Notably, such regulations can impede campaign workers from participating in clientelistic distribution⁵—a practice widely deemed illegal—as stringent enforcement can heighten the risk of detection and strong regulations can increase the cost incurred from punishment when caught (Hicken, 2007).⁶

⁴ Even though candidates can still hire campaign workers unofficially by paying them in cash and not including them on the official payroll, they run the risk of punishment for campaign violations if they are caught.

⁵ As with hiring campaign workers while excluding them from the official payroll, clientelistic activities can and often do occur off the books to avoid detection. However, as will be argued in greater detail in the next section, clientelistic distribution by private sector employees is more efficient because it offers legal plausible deniability, thus reducing the potential costs associated with clientelism.

⁶ Furthermore, a strong party with high organizational capacity is also crucial if efficiency from clientelistic distribution is desired. A high organizational capacity allows parties to effectively target and monitor clients, thereby enforcing the exchanges and ensuring that clients provide the expected political support (Stokes, 2005; Stokes et al. 2013, Brusco et al., 2004).

Similarly, the employment of patronage public sector employees faces regulatory constraints. Many governments employ a meritocratic system that limits the discretion politicians have in handing out jobs to their supporters who may not meet the meritocratic standards (Moon and Hwang, 2013). Regulations can also impose various requirements, such as educational or previous experience prerequisites, that reduce politicians' discretion in hiring. In addition, some positions may require potential hires to pass performance-based exams (Sundell, 2014). When enforced, these requirements create obstacles that make it more difficult for politicians to place individuals of their choosing in public sector positions.

Public sector employees can also face limitations regarding the types of electoral services they are allowed to provide to politicians, given that many public sector positions are expected to be non-partisan. Since many public sector positions are anchored in principles of neutrality and impartiality, it becomes imperative for these public sector employees to avoid any actions that could be perceived as favoring specific electoral candidates or political parties. As a result, actively engaging in political persuasion with citizens and providing preferential access to public services in return for political support can lead to backlash and career repercussions, especially if such actions violate established regulations and codes of conduct.

2.3 Incumbency Constraints

This last set of constraint primarily applies to the mobilization of patronage public sector employees for political services. Access to public sector resources is typically tied to political offices, and only those who hold public offices have control over or can significantly influence

how such resources are distributed. Many existing studies on patronage employment often assume that the actors under investigation are incumbent politicians (e.g. Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Oliveros, 2021; Kuo, 2018). This assumption is fair because non-incumbents usually do not have any say in public employment, at least not de jure, and therefore rarely have patronage hiring as an option among the electoral strategies available to them.

3 Overcoming Constraints with Private Sector Patronage Employment

Facing these aforementioned constraints, relying on traditional campaign workers and public sector employees for political services provision can be inefficient. This article contributes to the study of the labor sources employed by candidates in political service provision by proposing that businessperson candidates have access to an alternative labor source, namely patronage private sector employees, which allows them to achieve greater efficiency in extracting and maximizing the level of political services provided.⁷

Before moving further, I define private sector patronage employment as the exchange of private sector jobs in return for various forms of political support. As actors who manage the day-to-day operations of their firms or, at the very least, have substantial influence over the allocation of firm resources, businessperson candidates have the authority and capability to allocate their firm resources in a way that helps them garner political support and secure votes. This includes the distribution of jobs contingent on political service provision. While many

⁷ This argument assumes that firms of businessperson candidates have the resources available to hire private sector patronage workers.

studies have examined the distribution of public sector jobs in return for political support, private sector jobs have received less attention in the literature (Oliveros, 2021; Piattoni, 2001; Kuo, 2018; Robinson and Verdier, 2013). Even though the sources of these jobs differ, both public and private sector jobs are expected to serve a similar primary function: building an army of political workers who will provide political services to their patrons.

The defining feature of patronage hiring that distinguishes it from non-clientelistic forms of job allocation is that patronage employment is discretionary and contingent. Unlike a meritocratic system where jobs are distributed based on objective criteria such as years of job experience and exam scores, patronage jobs lack clear criteria for employment, or the criteria can easily be manipulated. Therefore, politicians have substantial autonomy in deciding who will receive or not receive these patronage jobs (Oliveros, 2021). Furthermore, the distribution of patronage jobs involves a quid-pro-quo exchange (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes, 2009). The provision of jobs is contingent upon the actions of the recipient, where those offered a job are expected to reciprocate by engaging in activities that support the politician's electoral campaign. Due to the costly nature of patronage jobs, they are typically exchanged for more than just turnout and a vote (Stokes, 2009). In the public sphere, studies have shown that patronage employees provide political services, such as assisting with campaigns, monitoring elections, and granting voters preferential access to public services (Oliveros, 2021).

Businessperson candidates have access to firm resources and can potentially utilize these resources for electoral purposes. Similar to how incumbent politicians have discretionary access to hiring in the public sector businessperson politicians who have discretionary access to and

control over private sector jobs can distribute jobs in a targeted and contingent manner.

Businessperson politicians distribute these private-sector jobs with the expectation that the employees will provide political support by offering political services that will improve the businesspeople's electoral prospects.

While expected to offer political services similar to those of traditional campaign workers and public sector patronage employees, hiring private sector patronage employees offer distinct advantages. First, it provides businessperson candidates with a loophole; unlike traditional campaign workers, private sector patronage employment is not subject to spending restrictions dictated by campaign finance laws. Businessperson candidates can claim that private sector patronage employees are hired for business-related tasks and, therefore, do not have to include them in campaign expenditure reports. If a firm has access to readily available financial resources, businessperson candidates can bypass the usual trade-off between worker quantity and quality, granting them the flexibility to employ a large number of competent patronage workers at any salaries the firm can afford.

Second, the distribution of goods and services to voters by private sector patronage employees provides businessperson candidates with plausible deniability when faced with accusations of clientelism. By having a private sector employee distribute goods and services produced by their firms to voters, businessperson candidates can argue that the distribution is part of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) campaign or a product promotion campaign, both legal forms of distribution, should there be an allegation that they are "buying votes" through this distribution. While traditional campaign workers and public sector employees can

distribute goods and services clientelistically, claims of CSR and product promotional campaigns are less credible when the actors responsible for the distribution are not directly tied to the firm but rather to an electoral campaign or to a public office, respectively. Therefore, patronage employees can serve as an effective cover for businessperson candidates when they engage in clientelistic distribution.

H1: Businessperson candidates can distribute private sector jobs to individuals to improve their odds of electoral victory.

4 Partisan Services Undertaken by Patronage Employees

Handing out private sector jobs is not without cost to businessperson politicians. Firms owned by businessperson politicians will have to bear the direct cost in the form of salaries for these employees. Additionally, there is an indirect cost to the firm's performance due to the potential misallocation of jobs to less capable and less productive candidates. Past studies have provided evidence of a trade-off between competence and loyalty (Hollibaugh, 2015; Krause and O'Connell, 2019). For businessperson politicians, potentially, they must decide between a candidate who is loyal to their campaign but has lower competence or a candidate with greater competence who may not be willing to take partisan actions in support of the businessperson. When businessperson politicians prioritize loyalty over performance, job candidates with greater firm-related competence may be turned away if businessperson politicians expect that these candidates will not engage in political activities to support the politicians' electoral

campaign. This may lead to a less competent workforce and, consequently, a decline in productivity and the firm's profit margin. Given the substantial cost of patronage hiring, businessperson candidates expect these patronage employees to engage in various political services aimed at improving the candidates' odds of victory in return.

H2: Patronage employees hired by businessperson politicians are required to provide several political services before and between elections.

Expanding on H2, I argue that patronage employees provide the following political services: 1) turning out to the polls to vote for the businessperson politician they work for; 2) attending political rallies of businessperson politicians; 3) persuading people within their social network to support and vote for the businessperson politician, and 4) distributing business benefits to voters as a way to influence their vote choice. These political services are expected to help businessperson candidates build a support base and win votes, thereby increasing the chance of an electoral victory for these businessperson candidates. Below, I will discuss in greater detail the activities carried out by patronage employees in the private sector.

H2a: Patronage employees turn out to vote for the businessperson candidate.

Patronage employees are expected to travel to the polling station on election day and vote for the businessperson they work for. Although a patronage employee might be hired

before an election to provide political services to a businessperson candidate running in the upcoming election, their responsibilities may also include turning out to vote for the businessperson candidate's political allies who are running for other political offices.⁸

Businessperson politicians can monitor turnout by asking employees to provide photographic proof of themselves at their polling station.

H2b: Patronage employees attend rallies of the businessperson candidate.

Existing work provides evidence that patronage employees in the public sector attend rallies of their patrons (Zarazaga, 2014; Oliveros, 2021). Similarly, patronage employees in the private sector are also expected to attend rallies of the businessperson they work for. Political rallies are often a crucial component of many politicians' electoral campaigns, serving several purposes. First, political rallies serve as a mechanism that allows politicians to signal their political support and electoral viability (Muñoz, 2014, 2019; Kramon, 2018). High attendance suggests that the candidate will win substantial votes and is electorally viable, thereby attracting more support. Hence, it is crucial for politicians to ensure robust rally attendance. To achieve this, businessperson politicians mobilize their patronage employees to attend rallies.

Second, businessperson politicians can gauge patronage employees' willingness to provide political services through rally attendance, which is easily observable. Monitoring

⁸ These political allies can come in the form of family members. As family businesses and dynasty politics are both still highly prevalent in Thailand, it is common for a business clan to run members of the family as candidates for various political offices (Thananithichot and Satidporn, 2016).

compliance is simple, as employers can record attendance or ask patronage employees to provide evidence, such as photos from rallies. Observing a patronage employee's failure to attend a rally provides businessperson candidates with valuable information to update their beliefs about that employee's likelihood of delivering expected political services. This information can help businessperson candidates reduce costs by terminating the employment of patronage employees who underperform (Auyero, 2001; Lazar, 2004). Given that rally attendance occurs before election day and is more costly for patronage employees than simply turning out to vote, it serves as a more effective mechanism than election turnout for identifying employees likely to renege on their commitment to provide required political services.

H2c: Patronage employees persuade acquaintances to support businessperson candidate.

Patronage employees are embedded within various social networks outside of their workplace. To garner more support and votes for businessperson politicians, these employees are expected to campaign for and persuade individuals within their personal networks to support and vote for the businessperson candidate they work for. Existing studies have shown that personal canvassing can improve turnout (e.g., Gerber and Green, 2000; Shaw et al., 2000). Conversations with acquaintances about businessperson candidates can be a form of direct canvassing, providing information about elections and motivating acquaintances to turn out on election day. Beyond mobilizing acquaintances to turn out on election day, patronage employees can attempt to influence their acquaintances' voting choices by highlighting the

positive attributes of the businessperson candidates. By discussing businessperson candidates in a favorable light, they can make these candidates more appealing to their acquaintances.

Unlike attendance at a rally and voter turnout, persuasion is not easily observable by businessperson politicians because it often occurs during patronage employees' personal time and in personal conversations. The unobservability of this activity means that punishing patronage employees who fail to engage in persuasion or excluding them from rewards is challenging. The sense of reciprocity will play a significant role in determining whether employees provide this political service. Patronage employees with a stronger sense of reciprocity will be more likely to undertake this task in exchange for the job they have received (Finan and Schecter, 2012). Moreover, these patronage employees may be motivated to persuade their acquaintances if they are deeply embedded in a dense social network. Social pressure from the network of these patronage employees can motivate them to reciprocate and provide this type of political service to the businessperson candidate they work for (Cruz, 2019). Given the difficulty of monitoring this activity, businessperson candidates likely do not expect this type of political service to generate a substantial number of votes. However, winning even a few extra votes may be significant in highly competitive elections. As a result, I expect a smaller proportion of patronage employees to engage in persuasion activities.

H2d: Patronage employees distribute short-term benefits.

Private sector patronage employees are also expected to engage in distributive activities with the goal of securing political support for businessperson politicians. They achieve this by either granting preferential access to, or withholding access from, specific business-related benefits, such as goods and services produced by their firms, to voters. The distribution of business benefits by patronage employees finds a parallel in the public sector, where numerous studies have presented evidence of public sector patronage employees targeting voters with various public sector benefits and services or withholding access to such benefits (Weitz-Shapiro, 2012; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016; Allina-Pisano, 2010).

At its most basic level, businessperson candidates can instruct patronage employees to distribute their firms' goods and services to voters at no cost. These distributed items can include vegetables, meats, and agricultural seeds (Ockey, 1992, 2004). Businessperson politicians can also authorize patronage employees to offer discounts on goods and services produced by their firms. Voters are then able to purchase goods and services at reduced prices before the election. These short-term discounts are typically applied to items with moderate costs, as providing them for free could be prohibitively expensive for the firms. Examples of such items include bags of fertilizers, insecticides, pesticides, and water filters. The defining characteristic of these short-term benefits is that they are distributed shortly before election day but not between elections.

To ensure returned support, businessperson candidates can monitor the benefit recipients to make sure that they vote for the businessperson candidate come election day and may also threaten to withhold access to these benefits in the next election if recipients fail to

vote for the businessperson in the current election. However, distribution does not always have to be contingent, and businessperson politicians may not always monitor benefit recipients. The distribution of these short-term benefits can instead serve the purposes of building credibility and protecting their political turf, thus obviating the need for monitoring and follow-up punishments by businessperson politicians (Hicken and Nathan, 2020; Hicken et al., 2022).⁹

The target of distribution does not always have to be an individual. Firms associated to businessperson candidates can also donate goods and services to social organizations. The distribution can be considered short-term when the donation to the social organization only occurs before an election in exchange for political support in the upcoming election, but it does not maintain any relationship with the organization between elections. Given the potentially large sum of money or resources involved in such transactions, patronage employees are expected to vet the social organizations, but not make the final decision as to which organizations will receive donations from the firm.

Donations to social organizations serve two purposes. First, these donations are part of a firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR) portfolio. Firms can assert that these donations are efforts to promote community welfare, which can help create a positive perception of the firm among voters (Chaudhary et al., 2016). An improvement in the perception of the firm can have a positive impact on the businessperson candidate associated with that firm.

⁹ In Thailand, credibility-buying through vote buying is a common practice, where politicians purchase votes to be seen as viable candidates capable of future distribution (Kongkirati, 2019).

Furthermore, firms of businessperson candidates may also have a second underlying purpose when making these donations, that is to mobilize political support from social organizations and their members. These donations come with the expectation that influential figures within these social organizations will persuade their members to support the businessperson candidate who provided the goods and services.

H2e: Patronage employees distribute long-term benefits.

Businessperson politicians can also provide voters with access to long-term business benefits and services, maintaining relationships with voters between elections. They may instruct their patronage employees to distribute free or discounted goods or services not only before specific elections but also in between them, provided that these individuals have rendered political services in previous elections. For example, a targeted individual might receive discounted groceries between elections, in addition to the free groceries they receive before an election. This long-term distribution aligns with Nichter's (2018) concept of relational clientelism.

Long-term distribution is expected to be more costly for businessperson politicians, as benefits are distributed not only during election periods but also in between them. Therefore, these politicians will incur higher costs from multiple rounds of payments compared to a one-time payment during election time, as seen with short-term benefits. Given the higher cost, businessperson politicians may restrict the distribution of long-term benefits to a select few

individuals, potentially local influential figures capable of mobilizing a large number of voters, thus providing greater returns to businessperson politicians for this form of costly distribution.

Furthermore, businessperson politicians can establish long-term relationships with social organizations, making donations not only before elections but also continuously between them. Social organizations, in turn, provide political services to businessperson politicians during election times. Similar to the distribution of short-term benefits to social organizations, the greater monetary cost of these donations means that businessperson politicians do not grant patronage employees full autonomy in deciding which social organizations will receive long-term donations from the firm. Patronage employees are likely to vet and gather information about social organizations on behalf of businessperson politicians.

5 Case Background

Thailand serves as fertile ground for investigating the mobilization of private sector employees for political services due to the various constraints faced by electoral candidates in relying on campaign workers and public sector employees for campaign support. First, budgetary constraints are among the primary obstacles electoral candidates encounter, both at the individual and party levels. At the individual level, the majority of electoral candidates in Thailand lack substantial personal financial resources necessary to assemble an effective team of campaign workers. According to financial disclosure data from 2019, 270 out of the 500 MPs elected (54%) in 2019 reported a total net worth of less than 20 million Thai baht (~\$660,000)

(Workpoint, 2019).¹⁰ Considering that personnel expenditure can cost around 500,000 Thai baht (\$16,000), many candidates would need to allocate a significant portion of their personal wealth to fund campaign workers.

Similarly, Thai political parties often face financial constraints, with limited public donations and often insufficient state subsidies (Waitoolkiat and Chambers, 2015). Future Forward was the only party to receive substantial donations, with 13 million baht in 2020 and 27.5 million baht in 2021 (Electoral Commission of Thailand, 2020, 2021). In contrast, other parties received less than 3 million baht in donations annually. While the Electoral Commission's Party Development Fund also offers subsidies to political parties, they are typically inadequate. In 2022, the Democrat party was the only party to receive a significant subsidy of around 13 million baht, while others received less than 1 million baht (Electoral Commission of Thailand 2022). These donations and subsidies are unlikely to cover campaign personnel expenses for more than 350 constituency electoral candidates and for the national campaign in the closed-list party list competition during an electoral season¹¹, at least not at a level that will allow all candidates in a party to be successful electorally. Consequently, electoral candidates in Thailand cannot fully rely on party resources to fund campaign workers.

Even in the absence of personal budget constraints, wealthy candidates are still restricted by the campaign spending limit set by the Electoral Commission, thereby

¹⁰ Electoral candidates who do not win an MP seat are not required to submit financial disclosures. However, it is likely that electoral candidates who lose will, on average, have an even lower net worth than those who win.

¹¹ The number of constituency electoral seats varies in each election, but there have been at least 350 seats in the previous six elections.

constraining their capacity to legally assemble a large campaign workforce. For the 2019 election, the expenditure limit for constituency candidates was 1,500,000 Thai baht (\$50,000). Given that this limit includes everything from spending on materials to holding rallies, the amount of expenditure that can be legally spent on campaign workers would have been less than this amount.

Furthermore, electoral candidates in Thailand face several constraints that curb their ability to engage in public sector patronage employment. Strong restrictions faced by politicians are evident in the limited prevalence of non-programmatic distribution of public sector resources in Thailand. Based on two surveys conducted by the Democratic and Accountability Linkages (DALP) Project, country experts reported in 2008 that the seven largest political parties in Thailand exerted a negligible level of effort in providing preferential access to public employment.¹² The second wave of the survey conducted in 2021 shows a slight increase in public sector patronage employment by Thai politicians, where the five largest political parties in Thailand, on average, expend a minor level of effort in providing preferential access to public employment.¹³ However, the two waves of the survey still suggest that Thai politicians, overall, utilize There are several reasons why patronage employment is not prevalent in Thailand. As argued previously, the use of patronage employment and the mobilization of public sector

¹² On a scale ranging from 1 = a negligible effort or none at all, 2 = a minor effort, 3 = a moderate effort, and 4 = a major effort, experts evaluated the following parties' efforts in providing citizens with preferential access to employment in the public sector or in the publicly regulated private sector as follows: Ruam Jai Thai Chart Pattana = 1.12, Palang Prachachon = 1.17, Chart Thai = 1, Pue Pandin Party = 1.28, Democrat = 1.22, Pracharaj Party = 0.99, Matchima Thipatai = 1.28. The average score for all parties is 1.15.

¹³ Using an identical scale as in the first wave of the survey, experts evaluated the following parties' efforts in providing citizens with preferential access to employment in the public sector or in the publicly regulated private sector as: Palang Pracharath = 2.62, Phuea Thai = 2.64, Future Forward = 1.83, Democrat = 2.36, Bhumjai Thai = 2.33. The average score for all parties is 2.36.

employees to provide electoral services are usually not available to challenger politicians, making this strategy unavailable for many challenger candidates. In the context of Thailand, an overwhelming majority of electoral candidates are challengers. For the 2019 election, only 343 of the 13,991 electoral candidates, or around 2.5%, were incumbents who had won a seat and served as MPs after the 2011 election (ThaiPublica, 2019).¹⁴ As the majority of electoral candidates are challengers, they likely lack access to public sector positions and are likely to have to rely on other forms of electoral workforce.¹⁵

Furthermore, the size of public sector accounts for a lower percentage of Thailand's total employment compared to other countries in which many studies of patronage are situated. Specifically, the percentage of the total country employees working in the public sector is 16%, 12%, 17%, and 12% in Italy, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, respectively (ILO, n.d.). In comparison, Thailand's public sector employment comprises only around 9.5% of the total employment (ILO, n.d.). With fewer public sector jobs available for distribution, Thai politicians may not find public sector patronage employment as an effective method to build an electoral workforce.

Finally, civil service hiring for general entry-level officials in Thailand requires individuals to take and pass examinations (Sivaraks, 2011), which are competitive with clear meritocratic selection criteria. Recruitment for higher-level and highly skilled positions is more arbitrary, with ministries and departments setting their own recruitment criteria (Sivaraks,

¹⁴ In the 2011 election, 500 MPs were elected. Therefore, the maximum number of incumbents was 500.

¹⁵ In the 2019 election, incumbents also had limited access to public sector resources since they were removed from their positions after a military coup in May 2014.

2011). As studies have found that patronage employees who provide political services to candidates by targeting administrative favors to political supporters tend to be those at the entry level (Muller, 2007; Toral, 2020), the existing meritocratic nature of recruitment at the entry level serves as a barrier that prevents Thai politicians from manipulating the hiring process to hire supporters to provide political services in the bureaucracy.¹⁶

These constraints alone, however, do not automatically lead to the mobilization of private sector employees for political service provision by businessperson candidates. Private sector patronage employment in Thailand is made possible by the fairly large and robust private sector, providing businessperson candidates with sufficient capital for this strategy. The country performed well on the index measuring the availability of capital promoting investment, ranking 11th, 29th, 34th, and 14th out of 141 countries in domestic credit available to the private sector, SME financing, venture capital availability, and market capitalization, respectively (World Economic Forum, 2019). The robust private sector is highlighted by Thailand's 21st place ranking out of 190 countries in the World Bank's "Ease of Doing Business" index in 2020 (The World Bank, 2020). As such, the thriving private sector offers an alternative and exclusive pathway for assembling an electoral workforce for Thai businessperson candidates.

¹⁶ Highly-skilled patronage employees are often hired not primarily for direct campaigning purposes but to enhance a politician's policy-making capacity (Muller, 2007). Politicians strategically place these skilled individuals in policy areas they consider important, enabling them to minimize bureaucratic shirking during policy implementation (Toral, 2020).

6 Research Design

6.1 *The Survey*

Measuring the frequency of political service provision in firms of businessperson politicians can be challenging using traditional survey methods because admission or denial of such behavior can have adverse legal and career consequences. Asking employees directly whether they have engaged in the distribution of benefits to business clients to persuade or obtain votes for businessperson candidates is likely to result in non-truthful answers.

Employees may fear that admitting to serving as brokers who distribute firm resources to voters in return for votes may get them into legal trouble. Conversely, employees may fear that denial of service provision could get them into trouble at work if the businessperson candidate discovers that they are not fulfilling their agreement to provide political services in return for their jobs.

To address these potential concerns arising from traditional surveys, I conducted online list experiments with employees in firms of businessperson candidates to elicit truthful answers. In list experiments, survey respondents are randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, where they are asked how many of the items on the list apply to them, without indicating which items. This approach ensures that no one will know whether the respondents engaged in a sensitive activity or not, as long as respondents do not indicate that all of the items or none of the items apply to them. Therefore, the anonymity of the survey is expected to result in more truthful responses.

For the list experiments in this study, each list contains five items. Four items are identical between the control and the treatment groups for each list. The fifth item in the treatment group is the sensitive behavior of interest, while the fifth item in the control group is a placebo.¹⁷ The difference in the average items reported by the control and treatment groups estimates the frequency of the sensitive behavior of interest.

In deciding the items to include on the lists, I included both low and high-prevalence items to prevent floor and ceiling effects, respectively (Blair and Imai, 2012).¹⁸ When respondents feel that all of the items on the list apply to them (ceiling) or that none of the items apply to them (floor), respondents in the treatment group may worry that they will inadvertently reveal whether they engage in the sensitive activity if they answer truthfully. Therefore, the estimate of the prevalence of the sensitive behavior might not accurately reflect the true frequency of that behavior if floor and ceiling effects are present.

To reduce the variance in the estimates of the means for the treatment and control groups, I included two negatively correlated items in each list (Glynn, 2013). The order of the lists was randomized for each respondent to avoid list-order effects, where receiving a particular list might influence how a respondent responds to subsequent lists (Glynn, 2013). The specific questions and items used in the list experiments are provided in Appendix B.

¹⁷ A placebo item is added to the control list to prevent bias arising from mechanical inflation in the mean of the treatment group due to the larger number of items on the list (Riambau and Ostwald, 2021).

¹⁸ A pilot study was conducted in December of 2021 to pre-test the lists and ensure that there are no ceiling and floor effects. There is no strong evidence of floor and ceiling effects from the pre-test. The distribution of respondents' answers across all lists is in Appendix C, which indicates that only a few respondents answered the maximum number of items or zero items on all the lists.

The list experiments aim to determine if employees in firms associated with businessperson candidates provide political support for the candidate they work for. Such political activities include voting for the businessperson candidate, attending political rallies, persuading acquaintances to support the businessperson candidate, and distributing short-term and long-term business benefits such as discounts and access to free goods and services to voters to shore up political support for the businessperson candidate. Aside from the list experiments, respondents were also asked to report demographic and background information, including age, gender, educational level, salary level, position level, month and year they were hired at their current firm, frequency of interactions with customers, frequency of reports to supervisors, types of contracts signed, their views on redistribution, and their views on reciprocity.

6.2 Sample Selection

For the selection of firms to conduct list experiments, I obtained a list of firms from the Ministry of Commerce's Department of Business Development (DBD). From this, I identified firms with ties to businessperson candidates in the 2019 election based on data from Elect.in.th, which collected information on the connections between 2019 MP candidates and firms. Among these firms with ties to businessperson politicians, I randomly contacted 500 of them to request permission to survey their employees. Out of those contacted, 72 firms granted permission for the study, representing 14.4% of the firms contacted.

The survey data was gathered via an online survey on Qualtrics. Between December 2021 and September 2022, a total of 986 employees from firms of businessperson politicians responded. For each firm, a random sample was taken from their list of employees. Those employees with work email addresses included in the sample were sent an email containing the survey link. For employees without a work email address, I liaised with my contact at each firm, asking them to directly contact those employees and to allow them to complete the survey on a computer or tablet at the firm using the link that I forwarded to the firm representative.

As the implementation of this survey requires permission and support from the firm representative, I tried to ensure that the survey did not intrude too much on the work or personal time of those involved. First, I sent the survey to the firm representative for approval before seeking their consent to conduct it within their firm. Second, I designed the survey so that respondents would take less than 20 minutes to complete it. I also deliberately avoided any direct questions about employers to prevent upsetting firm representatives or those in high-level positions within the sample firms.

Since the survey is conducted online, employees have the flexibility to complete it either at home or at their workplace. Recognizing that some might need to take the survey at work, there is a possibility that employees may be unwilling to provide truthful answers due to fear that their jobs might be in jeopardy if they provide answers that anger those in high-level positions. To alleviate this concern, the consent page of the online survey clearly outlines the study's purpose and assures the confidentiality of the data collected. Participants were informed that their responses would remain confidential and not be shared with anyone within the firm

or outside, apart from the researcher. After giving consent, respondents were automatically randomized into treatment or control groups by Qualtrics, which was set up to ensure an equal number in both groups. The balance test between the control and treatment groups is shown in Table 1. The treatment and the control groups in this study are balanced on all important observable characteristics.

Table 1: Balance Test for Observable Characteristics

Variables	Mean		t-test		
	Control	Treatment	Means Difference	p-value	T-statistics
Gender	0.604	0.560	0.044	0.156	1.421
Age Group	1.099	1.123	-0.024	0.780	-0.279
Educational Level	1.738	1.695	0.043	0.479	0.708
Position Level in Firm	0.736	0.696	0.040	0.453	0.751
Salary Level	1.035	0.980	0.055	0.286	1.067
Contract Term	1.227	1.151	0.076	0.137	1.490
Direct Customer Contact	0.627	0.594	0.033	0.297	1.045
View on Redistribution	2.320	2.326	-0.006	0.937	-0.079
View on Reciprocity	2.343	2.358	-0.015	0.851	-0.188
Reporting to Supervisor	2.128	2.121	0.007	0.938	0.078
Months of Employment from 2019 Election	-31.021	-31.562	0.541	0.791	0.265

As firms opt-in to this study by allowing me to survey their employees, a potential selection bias emerges since firms that consent may inherently differ from those that decline. However, firms with higher levels of patronage employment and more clientelistic distribution are anticipated to be more likely to reject my survey request. Consequently, the firms in the sample are likely to be those that either do not engage in patronage employment and non-programmatic distribution of resources, or those that do not heavily rely on such strategies. Therefore, the estimates from the list experiments are likely to be the lower-bound estimates of

the activities under consideration. It is possible that these activities might be more prevalent if I were to include all firms associated with businessperson candidates in the study.

To briefly evaluate this possibility, Appendix D provides a balance test comparing firms that allowed me to conduct the survey with those that denied my request or did not respond. Although these two groups of firms are balanced on most observable characteristics, certain unbalanced characteristics suggest that firms actively engaging in patronage employment are less likely to participate in the study. Specifically, participating firms are, on average, younger and are more likely to be situated in urban areas compared to non-participating firms. Despite the potential selection bias, the firms that participated in this study exhibit a broad spectrum of political, economic, and demographic characteristics. Table 2 displays the distribution of the sample firms across these characteristics. The diversity shown in Table 2 ensures that no particular characteristic is underrepresented in the sample, making generalizations from the sample firms more plausible.

Table 2: Political, Economic, and Demographic Characteristics of Sample Firms

Political, Economic, and Demographic Characteristics	Number of Firms
Region:	
North	14
Northeast	17
Central	28
South	13
Number of Employees:	
1-10	10
11-50	22
51-100	24
101-500	10
501-1000	6
Registered Capital:	
More than 5 million THB	5
4.5 million - 5 million THB	10
4 million - 4.49 million THB	9
3 million - 3.99 million THB	3
2 million - 2.99 million THB	10
1 million - 1.99 million THB	11
0.5 million - 0.99 million THB	18
Less than 0.5 million THB	6
Sector:	
Primary (Natural Resources Extraction)	35
Secondary (Processing and Manufacturing)	24
Tertiary (Services)	13
Party of Businessperson Candidate:	
Phuea Thai	20
Palang Pracharath	21
Future Forward	2
Democrat	13
Bhumjaithai	16
Margin of Victory in 2019 Election (Absolute Value):	
0-5%	11
5.01-10%	19
	33

	10.01-15%	17
	15.01-20%	17
	More than 20%	8
Types of Electoral System Businessperson Candidate is Competing in:		
	Party List	11
	Constituency	61
Average Household Income (2019) of Firm's Provincial Location:		
	More than 40,000 THB	13
	35,001 THB - 40,000 THB	7
	30,001 THB - 35,000 THB	15
	25,001 THB - 30,000 THB	16
	20,001 THB - 25,000 THB	12
	Less than 20,000 THB	9

7 Results from List Experiments

Table 3 presents the list experiment estimates for campaign services provided by employees in firms associated with businessperson candidates, including voting for the businessperson politician, attending their political rallies, and persuading people within employees' social networks to support the businessperson candidate. The control group averages for these activities are 1.927, 1.838, and 1.943, whereas the treatment group averages are 2.326, 2.126, and 2.134, respectively. The difference-in-means between the control group and the treatment group provide an estimate of the proportion of employees engaged in each of the activities of interest. Specifically, this study finds that 39.9 percent of employees working for businessperson candidates turned out to vote for the businessperson they work for, while 28.8 percent attended their employer's political rallies, and 19.1 percent engaged in persuasion

activities with members of their social networks. The estimates are statistically significant at the 95% level for all three activities.

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Table 3: Estimates of Incidence of Political Services Provision in Firms of Businessperson Politicians from List Experiments

Political Services	Mean Control	SE	95% CI		Mean Treatment	SE	95% CI		Differences	SE	p-value	T-statistic
Employee votes for businessperson tied to her/his firm	1.927	0.065	1.862	1.992	2.326	0.073	2.253	2.400	0.399	0.050	0.000***	8.036
Employee mobilizes acquaintances to attend rally of businessperson candidate	1.838	0.068	1.769	1.906	2.126	0.070	2.055	2.196	0.288	0.050	0.000***	5.757
Employee persuades acquaintances to vote for businessperson candidate	1.943	0.056	1.887	1.999	2.134	0.080	2.053	2.214	0.191	0.050	0.001***	3.816
Employee distributes short-term business benefits to voters	1.972	0.061	1.911	2.032	2.165	0.082	2.082	2.246	0.193	0.052	0.000***	3.713
Employee distributes long-term business benefits to voters	1.884	0.060	1.825	1.944	1.972	0.056	1.915	2.028	0.088	0.042	0.037**	2.086

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

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To substantively evaluate the magnitude of political service provision within firms of businessperson candidates, I will compare the estimates from this section with previous studies that have investigated the provision of political services by public sector patronage employees. Notably, more than a third of employees (39.9%) turned out to vote for the businessperson candidate associated with their firm. This proportion is slightly higher than that observed in a previous study analyzing the political behavior of employees within the New Haven political machine in 1974 (Johnston, 1979).¹⁹ The New Haven study finds that 33.4% of employees within the machine turned out to vote “often” or in “almost every election”.

While it is possible that the higher estimate among private sector employees can be attributed to the fact that businessperson candidates are able to hire a larger proportion of patronage workers among their workforce since they are bounded by less regulatory and budgetary constraints than their public sector counterparts, it is important to note that the larger estimates may not be solely due to this reason. It is possible that this task is likely to be undertaken not only by patronage private sector employees but also by non-patronage private sector employees who were not specifically hired to provide political services. Non-patronage employees may be motivated to turn out and vote for their employer, as the businessperson's electoral success could lead to business growth and potentially improved benefits and salaries for these employees (Cingano and Pinotti, 2013; Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009).

¹⁹ If the distribution of these private sector jobs is viewed as an attempt at vote-buying, the estimate from this study is on the high end compared to existing estimates from studies on vote-buying. Kramon (2016) finds that 23% of respondents in Kenya reported that vote-buying influenced their votes. Muhtadi (2019) finds that only 10% of respondents in Indonesia said that receiving money influenced their vote choice. Munoz (2014) presents data from two surveys where 14.7% and 12.3% answered affirmatively that they would honor the promise to vote for a candidate after receiving benefits from a candidate.

In contrast, non-patronage employees in the public sector typically do not personally benefit from the incumbent's electoral victory and are likely to retain their jobs regardless of the election outcome (Oliveros, 2021). As a result, public sector non-patronage employees have less motivation to support a particular candidate compared to their private sector counterparts.

Approximately 28.8% of employees surveyed reported attending rallies of a businessperson politician, a figure that is also slightly higher than the estimate for public sector employees. According to Oliveros (2021), about 22% of low-level and mid-level municipality employees attended political rallies of incumbent politician. As mentioned previously, the larger estimate among private sector employees compared to public sector employees can be attributed to the greater proportion of patronage employees in the workforce. However, it also points to the possibility that not only patronage employees in the private sector attend rallies, but also non-patronage employees in private firms. Non-patronage private sector employees are incentivized to attend these rallies to assist their employers in signaling their electoral strength and enhancing their employers' electoral prospects, as they stand to gain from their employers' ability to extract rent from their elected offices. Despite this, the proportion of private sector employees attending rallies is lower than those who vote. This may be due to the higher opportunity cost associated with rally attendance, which demands more personal time compared to voting. Consequently, a larger number of employees may be deterred from attending rallies than from voting for their employers.

Assessing the magnitude of acquaintance persuasion is challenging, given the lack of research that estimates the extent of persuasion activities undertaken by public sector patronage employees.²⁰ In comparison to other types of political services examined in this study, a smaller percentage of employees engage in persuasion activities. This may be due to the limited ability of businessperson politicians to monitor this type of activity. Persuasion often occurs spontaneously during personal conversations, making it difficult for businessperson candidates to ascertain whether employees dutifully perform this task. The low visibility of persuasion creates an opportunity for patronage employees to shirk and potentially not provide this political service.

Table 3 also provides estimates of the proportion of employees engaging in distributive activities. The average number of activities reported by employees in the control group and the treatment group are 1.972 and 2.165, respectively, for short-term benefit distribution. Therefore, 19.3% of the surveyed employees engaged in short-term benefit distribution. The difference-in-means is statistically significant at the 95 percent level. Distribution of long-term benefits was less common among employees in firms of businessperson candidates. Employees in the control group reported an average of 1.884 activities, while those in the treatment group reported an average of 1.972 activities. Thus, it is estimated that 8.8% of employees distributed long-term benefits to business clients. The difference-in-means is statistically significant at the 95 percent level.

²⁰ Despite the absence of research specifically addressing persuasion activities among public sector patronage employees, persuasion activities by beneficiaries of clientelistic exchanges are not unique. Gottlieb (2017) finds evidence that brokers in Senegal persuade and motivate voters to turn out and vote with ideas, rather than utilizing positive or negative inducements. Schaffer and Baker (2015) find that individuals who engage in frequent persuasion are more likely to be targeted for clientelistic gifts.

The lower prevalence of long-term benefit distribution is unsurprising due to the high costs associated with this strategy, which necessitates firms to commit more monetary resources for each client since distribution takes place not only prior to elections but also between them. With a larger financial impact on the firm, businessperson politicians would, therefore, be more cautious in granting patronage employees the authority to decide on the size and target of the distribution. Furthermore, businessperson candidates may also be inclined to distribute long-term benefits to a selected few, primarily influential targets who can mobilize more votes for the businessperson, reducing the occasions for patronage employees to engage in this activity. While only a small percentage admitted to direct distribution of long-term benefits, a larger proportion of respondents may still play a role in the long-term benefit distribution process, a role not captured by the sensitive item on the list experiment. For example, interviews that I conducted with employees in firms of businessperson candidates suggest that patronage employees collected information and vetted potential clients on behalf of businessperson politicians.

When comparing the magnitude of the two distributive activities to a previous study that examined the extent of favor-granting by public employees at City Hall to citizens, the estimates for the distributive activities in private firms found in this study are lower than those from the earlier study in the public sector. Approximately 44% of municipality employees in Argentina reported that they helped someone at the City Hall (Oliveros, 2021). A lower prevalence of distribution in private sector firms is not unexpected because businessperson candidates personally internalize the cost of distributing goods and services produced by the

firm in the form of reduced profit margins. In contrast, politicians using public resources do not fully internalize the cost of distribution since public resources are funded by taxes.

7.1 Robustness Check

To obtain unbiased estimates from the list experiment, it is crucial that respondents provide an accurate count of applicable items from the list. Considering that the survey is conducted online without direct supervision, there is a possibility that respondents may not carefully read the instructions, questions, or answer choices when completing the survey. To address this issue, I check for robustness by excluding observations where the survey duration is too short, as it is highly likely that these respondents rushed through the survey and thus did not give thoughtful responses. Appendix E presents the estimates of the proportion of employees providing political services, excluding respondents who completed the survey in less than 9 minutes, the bottom quartile of the total time used to complete the survey. Results from the robustness test show that the observed magnitude and significance in the full sample are not driven by responses from those who rushed through the survey and may not have paid full attention to instructions and questions.

8 Evidence of Patronage Employment

In order to examine whether businessperson candidates leverage private sector jobs to cultivate an army of political supporters who provide services aimed at boosting the candidates' electoral prospects (H1), I examine the behavioral differences between employees hired near election day and those recruited outside this timeframe. Businessperson politicians stand to

benefit most from patronage employees in the months leading up to an election, as this is when they can maximize rent extraction in the form of political services from patronage employees. While patronage employees may produce election-related output between elections by building and maintaining relationships with voters and clients, the majority of the expected political services, such as voting for the businessperson candidate, attending rallies, persuading acquaintances to support the businessperson candidate, and distributing business benefits, are carried out around election time.

Assuming these businessperson candidates discount their utility for future rent extraction (Byrd and Richey, 1998), they would derive the maximum utility if they could extract political services from patronage employees shortly after hiring them. The utility gain from patronage hiring is expected to decline if the provision of political services occurs further away from the hiring date due to discounting. Hiring patronage employees when there is no upcoming election means that businessperson politicians have to pay the salaries of patronage employees but do not receive any tangible returns until the next election. If this businessperson candidates' calculus holds, businessperson candidates are expected to intensify patronage hiring a few months leading up to election day, but not engage in extensive patronage hiring long before an election or after an election. As a result, I anticipate a hiring cycle in the firms of businessperson politicians that mirrors the hiring cycle in the public sector (Toral, 2020; Pierskalla and Sacks, 2019; Cahan, 2019).

Given that employees hired close to an election are more likely to be patronage hires, an observable implication is that employees who are hired in the months leading up to an election

will provide more political services than employees hired outside of this time period.²¹

Employees hired long before an election or post-election are more likely to be non-patronage employees who are not expected to provide political services.

To evaluate whether employees hired closer to an election exhibit different behaviors from those hired well before an election or after the election, I estimate and compare the difference-in-means between the control and the treatment groups for two subsamples: employees hired two months or less prior to the 2019 election, and employees hired outside this two-month pre-2019 election timeframe.²² The Electoral Commission of Thailand announced on January 23, 2019, that the MP election would take place on March 24, 2019. With the election date officially set, businessperson candidates were motivated to initiate patronage hiring, as they could immediately benefit from a range of political services offered by patronage employees. However, prior to the two-month mark, businessperson candidates likely had less incentive to hire patronage employees, as the uncertainty surrounding the election date increased the risk that they would have to pay salaries to patronage employees without being able to extract substantial political services.

Table 4 presents estimates from list experiments for two subgroups conditional on the time of employment, displaying results for five political services. The differences-in-means between the control and treatment groups among those hired two months before the election, as

²¹ I am not arguing for a clear-cut distinction where employees hired within the two-month time period prior to the election are all patronage employees, while those hired outside of this time period are non-patronage employees. Businessperson candidates can hire non-patronage employees in the said two-month period. Additionally, patronage employees hired during previous election cycles may still be working at the firm and providing political services. I only assume that the proportion of patronage employees among respondents hired in the two-month time period is greater than the proportion of patronage employees among respondents hired outside of this time period.

²² This includes those who were hired more than two months prior to the 2019 election day and those who were hired after election day.

shown in the first row of the table, are statistically significant at the 95 percent level for all political services except for the distribution of long-term benefits. To explain the null result for long-term distribution, it is important to note that the wording of the sensitive item on the list experiment only asks respondents whether they engaged in direct distribution of long-term benefits. It is possible that these patronage employees only took part in the process indirectly, such as by gathering information on potential clients.

For respondents who were hired outside the two-month period before the election, only two political services showed statistical significance at the 95 percent level: turning out to vote for businessperson candidate and attending rallies. As previously discussed, non-patronage employees had incentives to support businessperson candidates due to potential personal gains from business expansion if their employers were to win the election. However, concerning distributive activities, non-patronage employees were not hired for electoral purposes, and businessperson politicians may not have granted them the authority to distribute firm benefits to voters, thus explaining the lack of statistical significance for the two distributive activities among employees hired outside of the two-month period.

Table 4: List experiment estimates for political services conditional on time of employment

Time of Hiring	Political Services				
	Turning out to vote	Attending Rallies	Persuading Acquaintances	Distributing Short-term Benefits	Distributing Long-term Benefits
Two Months Prior to the Election	0.655*** (0.144)	0.603*** (0.159)	0.406** (0.151)	0.524*** (0.198)	0.233 (0.144)
Outside of Two Months Timeframe	0.291*** (0.097)	0.156** (0.073)	0.101 (0.088)	0.054 (0.107)	0.027 (0.071)
Differences between Two Groups (Row (1) – Row(2))	0.364** (0.174)	0.447** (0.175)	0.305* (0.175)	0.470** (0.225)	0.206 (0.161)

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

In terms of the magnitude of the estimates, 65.5%, 60.3%, 40.6%, and 52.4% of employees who were hired within two months prior to the election turned out to vote for the businessperson candidate they work for, attended rallies, persuaded acquaintances, and distributed short-term firm benefits, respectively. Although these figures may initially suggest that patronage hiring is inefficient, as less than two-thirds of recent hires provided political services, it is important to note that not all employees hired during this period were patronage hires and were therefore not expected to provide political services. As a result, the true efficiency of this strategy is likely higher than the estimates presented here.

When comparing the magnitude of various activities, voting for businessperson politicians is likely the least costly service, so it comes as no surprise that it has the highest prevalence. Both rally attendance and short-term benefit distribution also exhibit higher prevalence, possibly because supervisors can easily track employee provision of these services. As mentioned previously, monitoring persuasion can be difficult because it often occurs during

employees' personal time and arises spontaneously in casual conversations, resulting in it being the least prevalent among all political services.


Among employees hired outside the two-month timeframe, 29.1% and 15.6% reported turning out to vote for the businessperson politician they work for and attending rallies, respectively. This implies that close to two-thirds either did not vote or chose not to vote for their employers. Assuming the turnout rate for these respondents was similar to the general population, with 74.69% turning out in the 2019 election ²³, approximately 45% of respondents reported not voting for businessperson candidates from their firms. The reason for this seemingly low support among non-patronage employees is unclear and warrants further investigation in future research. A previous study suggests that a partisan workplace can have a polarizing effect on employees (Jones, 2013). Given that firms led by businessperson politicians are likely to foster partisan environments, this may prompt non-patronage employees, who may have minor grievances against their employers, to develop a stronger dislike of the businessperson candidate while working there, ultimately resulting in weak turnout and support at the polls among these employees.

To visualize the results, Figure 1 shows the differences in the proportion of respondents providing the five political services between the two subgroups. The results offer compelling empirical evidence that employees hired within two months of the 2019 election were more likely to provide political services to businessperson candidates than those hired more than two months before or in the months following the election. Panels (a) through (d) in Figure 1 reveal

²³ The voter turnout rate comes from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).

that the proportions of patronage employees voting, attending rallies, persuading acquaintances, and distributing short-term benefits are higher than the proportions of non-patronage employees providing the same political services by 36.4%, 44.7%, 30.5%, and 47.0%, respectively. The differences in proportions between the two subgroups are statistically significant at the 95 percent level for three activities: voting, attending rallies, and distributing short-term benefits. The difference in proportions for persuading acquaintances is statistically significant at the 90 percent level. However, the difference in proportions for long-term benefit distribution is not statistically significant, providing no conclusive evidence that those hired within two months of the election engaged more in long-term benefit distribution than those hired outside that time period. As previously discussed, this lack of difference possibly stems from the fact that both patronage and non-patronage employees did not primarily engage in the direct distribution of long-term benefits. However, unlike non-patronage employees, patronage employees collected information and vetted clients, assisting businessperson politicians in making the final decision on distribution.

Figure 1: Differences in Proportion of Employees Providing Political Services for Employees Hired Two Months Prior to Election vs. Employees Hired Outside the Two-Month Time Period



Examining the subsamples of employees hired within two months prior to the election and those hired outside of this period, strong evidence emerges indicating that businessperson candidates engaged in patronage employment just prior to elections. Those hired in close temporal proximity to the election were recruited to provide political services, in addition to

carrying out their usual firm-related duties. These findings support H1 and demonstrate that distributing private sector jobs can be an electoral strategy employed by businessperson candidates in order to enhance their likelihood of winning an election.

As a sensitivity analysis, I test the differences in the proportions of political service provision using different time cutoff points (six, three, and one month(s) prior to the election) for the two subgroups in Appendix F. In this analysis, the patterns found in Table 4 remain consistent when employing three-month and one-month cutoff points, with a higher proportion of employees hired closer to the election day (one, two, or three months prior) providing political services compared to those hired outside of these timeframes. However, for the six-month cutoff, the proportion of employees providing political services hired within six months prior to the election and those hired outside this period does not exhibit statistically significant differences for any of the five activities, suggesting that businessperson candidates do not hire patronage employees long before the election.

9 Conclusion

Businessperson politicians can leverage private sector jobs to assemble a workforce that efficiently provides political services, overcoming restrictions that limit the level and type of political services traditional campaign workers and public sector patronage employees can provide, thereby enhancing businessperson candidates' chances of electoral success. In exchange for these jobs, patronage employees are expected to provide a variety of political services.

This article presents quantitative evidence of political service provision by employees in firms associated with businessperson candidates. Findings from list experiments confirm that employees in these firms provide various political services in return for their jobs, such as voting for their employer, attending rallies, persuading acquaintances to support the businessperson candidate, and distributing short-term and long-term benefits. To demonstrate that businessperson candidates employ private sector jobs to increase their chances of winning elections, the article also shows that a higher proportion of employees hired within two months before the election provide political services compared to the proportion of those hired outside this time period. This indicates that businessperson candidates ramp up patronage hiring in close temporal proximity to an election so that these new employees can provide political services that boost the businessperson candidates' electoral prospects.

Hiring patronage employees might not be profit maximizing for a firm in the short term, as these employees often have to divert efforts from firm-related tasks to election-related tasks, consequently reducing the firm's productivity. Given this potential drawback, businessperson candidates are expected to use this strategy sparingly. While this article introduces the concept of patronage employment in the private sector, future research should delve into the cost-benefit calculus of this electoral strategy and identify specific conditions and contexts that incentivize or deter businessperson candidates to select private sector patronage employment as an electoral strategy.

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Appendix A: Defining Businessperson Politicians

As businessperson politicians are the central actor in this article it is vital to provide a clear definition for businessperson candidates. A businessperson candidate is defined as an electoral candidate who works as an electoral candidate who has worked as a businessperson before their electoral candidacy. An electoral candidate is considered a businessperson candidate if the individual serves in a management role, such as a managing director or deputy director, or holds a position within a firm's board of directors. Board members are responsible for setting the vision and goals of a firm but typically do not directly participate in implementing their recommendations or engage in the day-to-day operations of the firm (Hiller and Beaudesne, 2014). Individuals serving in management roles are usually closely involved in a firm's daily operations and have the authority to make day-to-day decisions regarding the allocation of firm resources to pursue the board's vision (Hiller and Beaudesne, 2014).

Formally, there is a separation of roles between the board and management, where board members do not regularly intervene in the daily operations of firms. However, in reality, many firms globally do not experience a complete separation between these two entities because the CEO often serves as the Chairperson of the board, meaning that boards are not entirely divorced from daily operations (Josephs, 2019). Nevertheless, there has been a recent trend in developed economies to separate the roles of CEO and board chair due to concerns over potential conflicts of interest (Pick et al., 2011). For instance, in 2005, only 30% of S&P 500 firms separated the roles of CEO and Chairperson, but by 2019, the percentage of firms with this separation had increased to 53% (Josephs, 2019). However, this trend has not gained traction in developing economies, including Thailand. Among the 223 Thai firms surveyed in 2000, 157

firms, or 71.04% of the sample firms, had a managing director who also served on the board, and the corporate environment has not seen significant changes since then (Wiwattanakantang, 2000; Settsatien, 2020). In addition to observing more managing directors serving on the boards of their firms in developing economies, there is another contrast in the corporate activities of board members between developed and developing economies. For instance, non-managing director board members in Thai firms regularly provide advice to managing directors on day-to-day management decisions, represent their firms in the media, and make hiring decisions for non-managerial positions (Wiwattanakantang, 2000).

The presence of managing directors on the boards of firms and the active involvement of non-managing director board members in daily corporate activities imply that daily operations remain under the purview of the boards in these developing economies, with board members expected to play more active roles in day-to-day operations compared to developed economies. Consequently, businessperson candidates who serve in management roles or hold positions on boards can influence decisions regarding the allocation of firm resources and mobilize these resources for electoral purposes.²⁴ Given that my argument is expected to apply to both businesspeople in management roles and those on boards in the context of Thailand, I code both types of businesspeople as businessperson candidates.

²⁴ No regulation forbids Thai MPs, who are not the Prime Minister or cabinet members, from continuing to serve as managing directors or as board members of private firms. Typically, MPs would step down from the role of managing director but continue to serve on the board of their firms. Consequently, incumbent MPs are still capable of utilizing firm resources for electoral purposes.

Appendix B: Items Included on the List Experiments

[Sensitive items on the list for the treatment group are highlighted in bold]

[Placebo items on the list for the control group are in italics]

The answer to this part of the survey will be stored separately from your answers to the demographic and background questions in the previous section. Since your answers in this section will not be directly linked to your personal information, your identity will be protected.

For each question, you are provided a list of items. **Please answer the number of items that apply to you in each question, but NOT which items, based on your experience from the 2019 general election.**

1. How many of the actions below apply to you?

- Discussed politics with your family
- Arrived to vote at the wrong precinct
- **Voted for the businessperson candidate connected to your firm**
- *Voted on a ballot that is in English*
- Held a different political view from other members of your family
- Traveled to your electoral precinct by motorcycle

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- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

2. How many of the electoral activities below apply to you?

- Saw a campaign poster of the businessperson candidate connected to your firm
- Had a one-on-one meeting with the businessperson candidate connected to your firm
- **Attended a political rally of the businessperson candidate connected to your firm in-person with people within your social network**
- *Voted on an electronic ballot*
- Watched the news about the businessperson candidate connected to your firm on television
- Listened to the news about the businessperson candidate connected to your firm on the radio

- 0
- 1

- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

3. How many of the actions below apply to you?

- Decided on who to vote for before the election day
- Traveled to the electoral precinct with acquaintances
- **Persuaded voters within your network to vote for the businessperson candidate tied to your firm**
- *Arrived at the precinct to vote at 2A.M.*
- Checked the candidate information board in front of your electoral precinct
- Registered for early voting and voted early

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- 4
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For each question, you are provided a list of items. **Please answer the number of items that apply to you in each question, but NOT which items, based on your experience since you have started working for your current firm.**

4. How many of the activities below apply to you?

- Talked to your family about what is going on at work at least once a week
- Promoted and advertised goods or services produced by your firm to acquaintances
- **Distributed short-term business benefits (e.g. short-term deals for discounted goods and services, several months of free goods and services, reduced interest rates for the first few months of payment) to voters**
- *Commuted from home to work on a private airplane*
- Recruited people to work for your company
- Attended a business conference on behalf of your company

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- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

5. How many of the activities below apply to you?

- Had a work-related conversation with your co-worker(s) outside work at least once a week
- Purchased goods or services produced by your firm at a discounted rate
- **Distributed long-term business benefits (e.g. long-term deals for discounted goods and services, continuous flow of free goods and services, reduced interest rates for the whole duration of payment) to voters**
- *Commuted from home to work on a hot air balloon*
- Invited your co-worker(s) to your house
- Never been out for a meal outside of work with your co-worker(s)

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6. How many of the following are true?

- Arrived to work late only once per year
- Lived more than 50 km. away from your workplace
- **Received a gift, a raise, or a bonus from the firm in return for providing political services to the businessperson candidate from your firm**
- *Had a one-on-one meeting with the president of the company everyday*
- Traveled to work on a motorcycle on most days
- Had lunch with your co-worker(s) regularly

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7. How many of the following are true?

- Always inform your supervisor when you expect to miss work
- Discussed politics with your co-worker(s)


- **Faced threats or consequences for not providing political services to the businessperson candidate from your firm**
- *Ordered in food from the Mandarin Oriental Hotel for lunch everyday*
- Commuted to work regularly with your co-worker(s)
- Had a discussion with your supervisor about workplace attendance









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DRAFT

Appendix C: Floor and Ceiling Effects

The distributions of respondents' answers to the list experiments for all questions are shown below. The histograms do not suggest the presence of ceiling and floor, as the proportion of respondents answering the maximum number of items or zero items on all of the lists is low.





Appendix D: Balance Test Between Sample Firms and Out-of-Sample Firms

Table D.1: Balance Test for Observable Characteristics Between Sample Firms and Out-of-Sample Firms

Variable	Means			t-test		Observations
	Sample	Non-Sample	Difference-in-Means	T-statistics	p-value	
<i>Individual-level variable</i>						
Gender of businessperson candidate (female = 1)	0.208	0.278	-0.070	1.319	0.190	500
Incumbency	0.167	0.217	-0.050	1.043	0.299	500
Electoral system (constituency election = 1)	0.847	0.766	0.081	1.708	0.091	500
Party						
Phuea Thai	0.278	0.259	0.019	0.322	0.748	500
Palang Pracharath	0.292	0.285	0.007	0.114	0.910	500
Future Forward	0.027	0.026	0.001	0.099	0.921	500
Democrat	0.181	0.154	0.027	0.539	0.591	500
Bhumjaithai	0.222	0.255	-0.033	0.605	0.547	500
Charthai Pattana	0.000	0.012	-0.012	2.247	0.025	500
Chart Pattana	0.000	0.009	-0.009	2.007	0.045	500
<i>Firm-level variable</i>						
Years in business	14.500	15.727	-1.227	2.142	0.035	500
Capital size (8-point scale)	3.083	3.617	-0.534	1.935	0.056	500
Rural location = 1	0.229	0.361	-0.132	2.183	0.032	500
Sector						
Primary Sector	0.486	0.532	-0.046	0.728	0.468	500
Secondary Sector	0.333	0.374	-0.041	0.668	0.506	500
Tertiary Sector	0.181	0.093	0.088	1.823	0.072	500
Region						
North	0.194	0.222	-0.028	0.539	0.591	500
Northeast	0.236	0.236	0.000	0.002	0.998	500
Central	0.389	0.357	0.032	0.504	0.616	500
South	0.181	0.185	-0.004	0.082	0.935	500
<i>Constituency-level variable</i>						
Average Household Income	2.472	2.505	-0.033	0.155	0.877	500
Provincial Population Size (in million)	2.440	2.081	0.359	1.322	0.189	500
Absolute 2019 Margin of Victory/Loss	1.889	2.005	-0.116	0.715	0.476	358

Appendix E: Robustness Test for the List Experiments

For the estimates from the list experiment to be unbiased, respondents must truthfully provide the count of the items on the list that apply to them. Given that the survey is conducted online and the respondents are not monitored while completing the survey, it is possible that respondents did not pay adequate attention to the instructions or read the questions and answer choices carefully. To address this issue, observations where the survey duration is exceptionally short, suggesting that respondents rushed through the survey without careful reading and truthful answering, are excluded in this robustness test. On average, the survey takes 18 minutes to complete, and for this analysis, I have chosen to exclude respondents who spent less than 9 minutes on the survey, which represents the lowest quartile of survey duration.

Table E.1 provides estimates of the proportion of employees providing political services, excluding respondents who spent less than 9 minutes completing the survey. The top row presents results that include all respondents who took more than 9 minutes to complete the survey. The estimates obtained after excluding employees who spent less than 9 minutes do not significantly differ from the previous analysis that included these respondents. Estimates of the proportion of respondents providing services for most activities, except attendance at rallies, increase by a few percentage points, with all remaining statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Among those who took more than 9 minutes, I divided the sample into two groups: those hired within the two-month time period and those hired outside that period, and the results are presented in the second and third rows of Table E.1. Once again, the estimates after excluding respondents who took less than 9 minutes only exhibit marginal differences from the full sample for all activities, and the statistical significance remains unchanged. These

results suggest that the magnitude and significance observed in the full sample are not influenced by responses from individuals who completed the survey in less than 9 minutes and may not have paid careful attention to the instructions and the survey questions.

Table E.1: Results for List Experiments Excluding Respondents Taking Less than 9 Minutes to Complete the Survey

	Turning out to vote	Attending Rallies	Persuading Acquaintan ces	Distributing Short-term Benefits	Distributing Long-term Benefits
All	0.411*** (0.059) N = 773	0.296** (0.058) N = 773	0.187** (0.058) N = 770	0.214*** (0.059) N = 769	0.092** (0.046) N = 769
Two Months Prior to the Election	0.692*** (0.159)	0.624*** (0.185)	0.409** (0.157)	0.548** (0.217)	0.238 (0.152)
Outside of Two- Month Timeframe	0.314*** (0.101)	0.161** (0.080)	0.105 (0.092)	0.062 (0.117)	0.029 (0.078)
Differences between Two Groups	0.378** (0.188)	0.463** (0.202)	0.304* (0.181)	0.486** (0.247)	0.209 (0.171)

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Appendix F: Sensitivity Analysis for the Differences in Proportions of Employees Providing Political Services Using Different Cutoff Points

To conduct sensitivity analysis, I test the differences in the proportions of political service provision using different time cutoff points for the subgroups under analysis: six, three, and one month(s) prior to the election. The results are provided in Table F.1, F.2, and F.3. In Figure F.1, I have included a plot that displays the differences in proportions of employees providing five political services between those hired within a specific timeframe and those hired outside that timeframe (row 3 from Table 4, F.1, F.2, and F.3).

Table F.1: List Experiment Estimates for Political Services Conditional on Time of Employment with Six-month Cutoff Point

Time of Hiring	Political Services				
	Turning out to vote	Attending Rallies	Persuading Acquaintances	Distributing Short-term Benefits	Distributing Long-term Benefits
Six Months Prior to the Election	0.266** (0.134)	0.227* (0.125)	0.195 (0.121)	0.204 (0.126)	0.083 (0.114)
Outside of Six Months Timeframe	0.218* (0.113)	0.120 (0.080)	0.101 (0.093)	0.046 (0.117)	0.026 (0.092)
Differences between Two Groups (Row (1) – Row (2))	0.048 (0.175)	0.107 (0.148)	0.094 (0.153)	0.158 (0.172)	0.057 (0.146)

Table F.2: List Experiment Estimates for Political Services Conditional on Time of Employment with Three-month Cutoff Point

Time of Hiring	Political Services				
	Turning out to vote	Attending Rallies	Persuading Acquaintances	Distributing Short-term Benefits	Distributing Long-term Benefits
Three Months Prior to the Election	0.607*** (0.138)	0.503*** (0.141)	0.360** (0.143)	0.485*** (0.135)	0.118 (0.129)
Outside of Three Months Timeframe	0.246** (0.102)	0.143* (0.073)	0.130 (0.090)	0.042 (0.098)	0.028 (0.084)
Differences between Two Groups (Row (1) – Row (2))	0.361** (0.172)	0.360** (0.159)	0.230 (0.169)	0.443** (0.167)	0.090 (0.152)

Table F.3: List Experiment Estimates for Political Services Conditional on Time of Employment with One-month Cutoff Point

Time of Hiring	Political Services				
	Turning out to vote	Attending Rallies	Persuading Acquaintances	Distributing Short-term Benefits	Distributing Long-term Benefits
One Month Prior to the Election	0.658*** (0.182)	0.607*** (0.195)	0.414** (0.165)	0.506** (0.202)	0.217 (0.165)
Outside of One Month Timeframe	0.317*** (0.070)	0.200*** (0.059)	0.106 (0.069)	0.066 (0.082)	0.036 (0.061)
Differences between Two Groups (Row (1) – Row (2))	0.341* (0.195)	0.407** (0.204)	0.308* (0.179)	0.440** (0.218)	0.181 (0.176)




Figure F.1. Differences in Proportions of Employees Providing Political Services Between Employees Hired Within a Timeframe and Outside the Timeframe

The proportions of respondents providing services between employees hired within six months prior to the election and those hired outside this period do not exhibit statistically significant differences for any of the five activities (row 3 of Table F.1). These findings support my argument that patronage employment predominantly occurs in the months leading up to the election. The smaller differences observed when employing a six-month cutoff, compared to those observed when using a two-month cutoff (row 3 of Table 4), can be attributed to the increased similarity between the two subgroups. This similarity arises due to the inclusion of more non-patronage employees, specifically those hired between three to six months before the election, in the subgroup of employees hired within six months of the election. Consequently, this subgroup begins to resemble the subgroup of employees hired outside the six-month period, which predominantly consists of non-patronage employees. As a result, smaller differences between these two subgroups are observed when using a six-month cutoff, in contrast to the findings when employing a two-month cutoff.

The differences in proportions of employees providing political services between those hired within three months of the election and those hired outside this period are statistically significant at the 95 percent level for election day turnout, rally attendance, and the distribution of short-term benefits. However, when comparing the magnitude of the differences between the two subgroups (row 3 of Table F.2) to the analysis using a two-month cutoff for all activities (row 3 of Table 4), the magnitude from the analysis using a three-month cutoff is smaller. Similar to the case of the six-month cutoff point, the smaller magnitude of differences between the two subgroups for the three-month cutoff point can be explained by their increased similarity. As more non-patronage employees are included in the subgroup of employees hired

closer to the election, the two subgroups become more alike, resulting in smaller differences between employees hired near the election and those hired outside this timeframe.

he results from the one-month cutoff reveal smaller differences in the proportions of employees providing political services between those hired within one month of the election and those hired outside this period (row 3 of Table F.3) for all political services, except for rally attendance, compared to the differences in proportions observed in the analysis using a two-month cutoff (row 3 of Table 4). These smaller differences between the two subgroups can be attributed to the higher means of the treatment group among those hired outside the one-month timeframe when employees hired two months before the election are included in this subgroup. The increased means of the treatment group for those hired outside the one-month timeframe led to higher estimates of the proportion of employees hired outside the one-month period providing political services. As the proportion of employees hired outside the one-month timeframe providing political services rises, while the proportion of employees hired within one month providing political services remains relatively unchanged, a smaller difference emerges between the two subgroups when using a one-month cutoff, as opposed to the two-month cutoff.

In conclusion, the patterns found in Table 4 remain consistent when employing three-month and one-month cutoff points, with a higher proportion of employees hired closer to the election day (one, two, or three months prior) providing political services compared to those hired outside of these timeframes. However, the magnitude of the differences between subgroups varies when changing the cutoff point. For all activities, excluding rally attendance, the largest magnitude of the differences between the two subgroups is observed when the

cutoff point is set at two months before the election. The results indicate that the two subgroups—those hired in close proximity prior to an election and those hired outside of this timeframe—exhibit the greatest divergence in behavior when the cutoff point is closer to the election, suggesting that businessperson candidates tend to engage in more intensive patronage hiring as the election day approaches, compared to periods further away from the election.

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